Resetting US-Russia Relations?

Last week brought several major developments in US-Russia relations. First, reports surfaced early in the week from the New York Times and the Russian newspaper Kommersant that President Obama had sent a secret letter to the Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, allegedly offering to back down on the Bush administration’s plans for missile defense in exchange for Russia’s help in persuading Iran to end its nuclear program. Then last Friday, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton met Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in Geneva, where they agreed on preparations for a replacement to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which will expire later this year.

Discussions over Iran figured prominently in the Clinton-Lavrov meeting and will remain a top priority in the bilateral agenda. President Obama flatly denied the rumor that the secret letter contained any quid pro quo, exchanging the proposed missile defense systems for Russian cooperation. Rather, he stated that the letter simply confirmed that the missile defense system was targeted at Iran, not Russia, and that United States stands ready to continue dialogue with Russia over this issue. Even Defense Secretary Gates made it clear that missile defense is intended to counter an Iranian threat, and would no longer be necessary should that threat disappear.

President Medvedev categorically rejected the idea that Russia would participate in any kind of trade-off over missile defense, though he reaffirmed his commitment to continue discussions on this with the United States. Not surprisingly, there has been a mixed response to the letter from both Russians and Americans. Those who opposed the installation of a missile defense system see it as a win-win situation for the United States: getting rid of something we did not need in the first place and gaining a major diplomatic breakthrough. Others view the secret letter as both naïve capitulation to Russia and betrayal of the Czech and Polish leadership, who supported the United States’ plan in spite of strong domestic opposition and may now gain little to nothing in return. It is also not clear just how much leverage Russia has over Iran. Certainly a veto in the Security Council counts as something, but the Russian-Iranian relationship is fraught with difficulties of its own, and Russia may not have quite the power of persuasion that some in the United States would like to think. At the same time, however, should both Russia and the United States engage in negotiations with Iran, they could potentially create opportunities for other solutions that have not been apparent so far.