An Asymetric Strategy for an Asymetric War
As 2007 came to a close, America's attention focused primarily on the re-emergence of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as on the highest level of troop casualties since the Vietnam War. It is thus not surprising that in this somber atmosphere of war and bloodshed, one of the most important speeches ever delivered by an acting Secretary of Defense went largely unnoticed.
On November 26th, 2007, Secretary Robert Gates delivered a speech at Kansas State University in which he committed what some at the Pentagon might have considered blasphemy by arguing for an increased budget for the State Department. Secretary Gates admitted that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan simply cannot be won by military might alone. Long term success, he argued, requires the assistance of civilian experts to promote economic development and institution building, tasks which up until recently have been largely preformed by American men and women in uniform. While these troops have made considerable progress despite their lack of training in the use of so called "soft power," the time has come for diplomats who speak the language and are experienced in both the physical and theoretical demands of nation building to carry the torch in rebuilding Iraq and Afghanistan. The only problem is that these diplomats do not exist.
Op-ed after op-ed as been written about the need to expand our civilian capacity on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan and yet at this very moment there are currently more men and women serving in the military band corps than in the entire Foreign Service. If Secretary Gates was serious about the importance of "soft power" to success in Iraq and Afghanistan then it is time for him to put his money where his mouth is and donate a miniscule portion of his $623 billion budget to the State Department. Such an unprecedented act would go a long way towards convincing Congress that bricks and boards are just as important to the future security of Iraq and Afghanistan as bombs and bullets.
While the majority of the United States military spending is currently going to supporting the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, there are many long term projects that could be downsized or delayed to provide the State Department with additional funds to prop up its paltry $36 billion foreign affairs budget. $21 billion could be saved in FY08 by reducing the US nuclear arsenal from 10,000 weapons to a 1,000 missile arsenal. Another $23 billion could be saved by scaling back or stopping the research, development and production of weapons systems such as the F/A-22 fighter jet and the DDG-1000 Destroyer that were designed with a Cold War mentality but have no present day competitors. This potential re-appropriation of funds should not be thought of as budget cuts or decreases in military spending, but should instead be labeled as a new Marshall Plan for the Middle East. Many in Congress will likely scoff at the idea that less spending on defense can lead to greater security in Iraq and Afghanistan, however, could an asymmetric strategy be the most logical solution to an asymmetric war?
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If troops aren't going to be
If troops aren't going to be provided with enough weapons, then they shouldn't even be in Iraq or Afghanistan. Why should American soldiers be in danger without the necessary weapons to kill terrorists? If the government is worrying about cutting funding, then they should end the war and pull out the troops.
Asymmetric Reallocation Too Easily Excuses the Ideology
Although I would agree that the funding for the DOD as compared to the State Department is grossly imbalanced, I think discussion of where the funds are to be allocated reflects surface thinking of the real problems that afflict not only the DOD and the State Department, but the whole of U.S. foreign policy.
The State Department (as well as many other agencies, including USAID most notably) are designed with the same goal in mind, as have been almost all of the military operations conducted since Vietnam; the promotion of the securing of American interests across the globe. Such interests of course being the attainment of energy resources among many others. The tactics used vary depending on who is exercising them (DOD - "bombs and bullets" State - "bricks and boards"). Although the mission may seem more noble coming from State, it becomes necessary to realize that such missions are either consciously or sub-consciously conducted under the presumption of U.S. interests being satisfied first, if not exclusively. Such attitudes have reflected in our actions, both militarily (i.e. the CIA orchestrated coup of Moussadiq in Iran) and through civilian efforts, such as injecting a culture with American ideologies and systems of government when it is unwelcomed and even refused by the majority of its subjects.
Do I believe that the government should invest more in "soft power" than "hard power"? Absolutely! Although, a reallocation of funds will not reform the ideological underpinnings that justified past actions and disproportionate allocations. A deeper and more fundamental change in how the government and we as people see the world and our place within it must come about.
Patrick McDermott
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AFRICOM
Honestly, I think the very idea that DoD would allocate some of its funds to State is not only unrealistic, it's a terrible idea. The DoD budget as a percentage of GDP was at 3.9% in 2005. That is a very low historical percentage.
But State needs more support, to be sure. The answer is not to take away from DoD, but to find other means of funding. Like maybe tackling the entitlements.
And just to piggyback on Thomas' comment, I'm also interested to see what AFRICOM can achieve. We must integrate our tools of statecraft and security; Thomas Barnett has some interesting ideas on the subject. I particularly like his System Administrator force idea -- we cannot keep asking 20 year olds to be warriors one day then aid distributors the next.
Anyway, that was sort of tangential, but I enjoyed your post Jeremy as well as all of the responses.
Mr. White, Although I agree
Mr. White,
Although I agree with some of the points you make, particularly that State is horribly underfunded, I don't agree with your proposal to reallocate DoD funds to bolster State's budget. The programs that you mentioned, the F/A-22 and other expensive, Cold War mentality projects should be thrown out. These funds could be (and in my opinion need to be) diverted within the DoD to improve the quality of life for our servicemen and women for better equipment, armor, medical care, psychological treatment, etc. The equipment that we are currently using has not stood up to the rigors of such a harsh climate, and given the possibility of extended operations in the region, significant research and development needs to be done to address such issues. The funds that you suggest should go to State would be a boon to long term investment in our military strength. However, I heartily agree with you that significant improvements need to be made to our nation building and stability capabilities. If funding wasn't taken from the DoD, where would it come from? Do you believe that an institution or civilian entity should be established for the sole purpose of such operations, or should State be given greater responsibility?
DoD & DoS cooperation
Good comments Jeremy. I agree that many of our weapons systems are completely ineffective if considering that the majority of threats we face are now from asymmetric forces.
There is one very interesting effort underway that could establish something of a framework for Defense and State cooperation - the new Africa Command. Although it has had significant troubles selling itself, especially in terms of finding a host nation, the organizational structure of the command itself is interesting. From my understanding of it, while the CinC will (always) be a 4-star, the #2 duties are split between a military officer and State Dept civilian, with the civilian running the economic, social, development issues and providing assistance on stability/ peacebuilding to the military side. Additionally, other agencies will be joined in via MOU. While the civ leadership never achieves the #1 spot in the command, they do have (on paper at least) significant authority, input and leeway in which decisions are made, and just as importantly, how they are implemented.
This seems a large step in the right direction. While organization charts may not be the most exciting issue in foreign policy, they can make distinct and telling statements about the nature of each organization. Organizing State and DoD on largely equal footing in what is likely to be the next decade's "CENTCOM" presents unique opportunities for global engagement. However, the proof that a significant shift in military-civilian cooperation has taken place will only come when it is apparent that the civilian partners are more than figureheads - likely via some institutional head-butting.
If only money were the only problem...
Jeremy is absolutely correct when he notes the appalling difference in funding for the Department of Defense and the State Department. There is a desperate need for a rebalancing of U.S. tools of statecraft in the world of national security resource planning, since DOD gets a grossly disproportionate amount of funding compared to our other tools of statecraft for national security - foreign assistance, diplomacy, intelligence, and homeland security.
Clearly, the State Department (really budget function 150 - the international affairs budget, which in addition to State Department operations covers foreign assistance programs that span dozens of departments from USAID to Peace Corps to OPIC, to the Treasury Department, and beyond) deserves more funding if it is to fill an appropriate role.
Unfortunately, the problem runs deeper.
The State Department needs a dramatic shakeup in its human resources philosophy. It needs to change the way it recruits foreign service officers, the way it trains them, and how they reach the upper ranks of the foreign service.
As for hiring, the process needs to be far more open and flexible. Joining the foreign service as a mid-career professional (to join in its middle ranks) must be made to be an option so that State can bring in people with regional and functional expertise developed outside of the Department. On training, the Department needs to begin to train foreign service officers for the 21st century. Instant and constant communication with Foggy Bottom renders much of the traditional foreign service officer’s job irrelevant. In order to run the phase zero and nation-building operations that everyone is clamoring for, we need a foreign service with considerable project management expertise. This currently doesn’t exist, so there needs to be a shift in how our diplomats are trained. Lastly, people need to be rewarded, instead of punished, for taking tours in other departments, in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the various tools of statecraft at our disposal to ensure our national security. I would be much more comfortable with an ambassador who has served at the Pentagon or the NIC at some point in his/her career than one who hasn’t.
While money would be a good start, there is much more that needs to be done.
institutional differences
Could part of the reason behind this lack of cooperation be that DOD and DOS seem to have different institutional cultures -- and thus are hesitant to work together? Ive generally heard this to be the case, but would be interested to hear the perspective of current or past employees. How well do you think the two groups would interact on joint missions?
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