A History of Violence

The most recent post on this blog by Greg Sanders refers to some historical and current comparisons as far as the kinds of goals we should be seeking in Afghanistan, which will help us (more importantly, the President) determine the best course of action to take.  It is an important part of policy to take full account of historical and cultural importances and differences in the decision making process.  However, in doing, so we must be careful on what interpretations of history we are examining.

Memory is a funny thing.  So is history.  Often times when a contentious issue is looked back upon, observers and players on different sides of an issue will remember things quite differently, creating different versions of history.  This can even extend beyond interpretations of intents and actions but with regards to what actually did or did not happen.  What good is analyzing history if the history you examine is inherently biased?

Gian Gentile of the New York Times wrote an editorial this week entitled Chimera of Victory that gives several examples warning of the pitfalls of 1. assuming that complete 'victory' in Iraq has been secured and 2. basing Afghanistan troop strength/strategy decisions based on that Iraq 'success'.  So often in history writers will attempt to label a counterinsurgency a victory, when in fact the outcome was far from it.  The French declared victory in Algeria despite the French Army's pull out in 1961 and subsequent Algerian independence.  He also mentions Vietnam, describing extremely varying levels of preceived success.  Some believe US mindset and strategy was fundamentally flawed, while others believe General Abrams could have won the war were it not for the 'weakness of American politicians and public'.

The danger of interpreting history in order to support what you want rather than examining history in order to help develop what you need to do is dangerous.  There is no shortages of comparing Afghanistan to Vietnam.  But the right lessons have to be taken from Vietnam in order for us to be successful, not just accusations of weakness and then making the same fundamental mistakes again.  History is tricky in that you can make it say almost anything you want it to say.  With regards to our decisions in Afghanistan, we have to extract the right lessons of counter-insurgency strategy and pacification techniques from Vietnam, not just blame its opposers and argue that the opposition is doing the same today.  Either our lessons from Vietnam will make for a more effective Afghan strategy, or we run in circles again, looking for who to blame.