Should the United States eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile?

Defense & Security

Some argue that the very existence of nuclear weapons leaves the world vulnerable to nuclear terrorism and that failure to pursue disarmament risks efforts aimed at nonproliferation. Others question the feasibility of disarmament. They argue that nuclear weapons provide a stabilizing role in international security by deterring aggression and that it would be strategically irresponsible to press for abolition given nuclear states such as North Korea and potentially Iran. YOU DECIDE if the United States should eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile.

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Nuclear Weapons and the Security they Provide

Scott Duncan

A widely read op-ed piece by Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George Shultz in January of 2007 called for a renewed global commitment to the abolition of nuclear weapons and reopened the discussion about a possible elimination of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. These four statesmen called for U.S. leadership on the issue, proposing a number of concrete measures the United States could adopt to demonstrate its commitment to this vision. While many of the steps recommended are prudent, absent fundamental changes in the prevailing international security environment and without a reversal of the trend towards more, not fewer, nuclear weapons states, the United States should plan to maintain its nuclear stockpile indefinitely.

While the end of the Cold War lessened nuclear tension and secured a period of supremacy for the United States, it did not bring about an end to the security dynamics that led to a reliance on nuclear weapons for security in the first place. In fact, the present environment is in many ways now more challenging, with a spectrum of threats ranging from hostile and nuclear armed regimes such as North Korea to near-peer competitors like China and Russia, whose nuclear capabilities are considerable and whose intentions and trajectories remain uncertain. The existence of a reliable U.S. nuclear stockpile helps to deter aggressive behavior by the former and hedge against the uncertainties inherent in our relationships with the latter.

Nuclear proliferation itself is an additional challenge in the present security environment. Some have argued that U.S. possession of nuclear weapons weakens its position in non-proliferation efforts. While recent history indicates that states still value nuclear weapons to enhance their security and political status, it does not demonstrate that the existence of a U.S. nuclear stockpile encourages countries to acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that U.S. foreign policy affects states’ decision-making, it seems that proliferators seek nuclear weapons as a means to counter overwhelming U.S. conventional superiority, rather than as a response to U.S. nuclear posture.

On the contrary, U.S. nuclear weapons play a positive non-proliferation role by helping to assure allies. Japan enjoys the benefits of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and, despite living in what many would consider a difficult neighborhood, has resisted the temptation to acquire nuclear weapons. Similarly, the U.S. nuclear commitment to NATO assures states like Germany and Turkey against potentially hostile behavior from Russia or Iran. Some have proposed the removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe as a step that would demonstrate its commitment to disarmament, but it seems that such a step might do more harm than good. Consider a future in which, when faced with a newly aggressive Russia or fully nuclear-capable Iran, NATO allies might consider developing indigenous nuclear capabilities. A clear and steadfast nuclear commitment to NATO makes this potential proliferation less likely.

While the time is not right for the U.S. to declare its intention to abolish its nuclear stockpile, it is important to continually assess the implications of a nuclear-free world and what it would take to achieve that vision. In considering the question, it is critical to appreciate the broad spectrum of political issues that have become intertwined with nuclear weapons. It seems that full disarmament could not be achieved absent a lasting resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian situation, stabilization of the broader Middle East, and an end to the decades-long conflicts between India and Pakistan and North and South Korea. Beyond this, a reordering of the international political structure towards unanimous consent for stronger collective security institutions and more invasive verification regimes would also be needed. In the long-term, all of this is possible. However, the path that would bring us closer to these outcomes remains very unclear. In the indefinite period between now and the resolution of these outstanding challenges, a reliable U.S. nuclear stockpile will continue to deter aggression and reduce pressures for proliferation.

Scott Duncan is a graduate student concentrating in international relations at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University, where he is a candidate for the Masters Degree in Public Affairs.

The content is exclusively the personal opinion of the author. Under no circumstances should the content be attributed to CSIS, Next America, or the author’s employer, unless explicitly stated.

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Nuclear Elimination

Alexandra_Toma

Nuclear weapons have only been used once in history, when the U.S. bombed Hiroshima and Nagasaki over 60 years ago. Throughout the Cold War, the doctrine of “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) kept the Soviet Union and the United States in a precarious nuclear balance. When this standoff ended, we breathed a collective sigh of relief. Enter the post-9/11 world, with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups doing anything they can to get their hands on a nuclear weapon or nuclear know-how. Not only do the thousands of existing nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert continue to be extremely dangerous, strategically useless, and costly to maintain and secure, but the surge in terrorist organizations seeking nuclear weapons/technology makes having and securing nuclear stockpiles a much more risky proposition. The next president should begin to draw down – and eventually eliminate – U.S. nuclear weapons.

The Problem. The real nuclear risks for the U.S. are an unintended nuclear launch; global proliferation; and nuclear terrorism.

First, the U.S. and Russia – scarily repeating the tense relationship exhibited in the Cold War – have about 2,500 nuclear warheads on hair-trigger alert (i.e., ready to be fired in under three minutes). Mistakes in the past have gotten us minutes away from nuclear war.

Second, as nuclear weapons remain at the crux of U.S. security policy, other countries – some of which cannot secure their warheads as strongly as needed – will also see these weapons as central to their security and either maintain their current stockpiles or seek to acquire weapons to bolster their national security.

Finally, the more nuclear weapons there are in the world, the greater the chance that one will fall into the wrong hands. There are eight countries (plus probably North Korea and possibly a future Iran) that possess nuclear weapons; together, these countries have over 27,000 nuclear weapons. Many leading nonproliferation experts see nuclear terrorism as the #1 threat to U.S. national security. Most recently, at the Peace and Security Initiative’s annual meeting, Ambassador Bob Gallucci – the lead negotiator of the 1993 Agreed Framework with North Korea – highlighted nuclear terrorism above any other nonproliferation threat. “We have neither defense nor deterrence against nuclear terrorism,” with U.S. borders (especially maritime ones) being porous and with terrorists valuing our death over their own life. Nuclear materials can either be leaked (most likely from Russia or Pakistan) or transferred (most likely from North Korea and Iran) to terrorists groups.

What Can Be Done? In a groundbreaking January 4, 2006 Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, four prominent Republican and Democratic statesmen (Schultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn) recommended a “world free of nuclear weapons.” Additionally, both presidential candidates Obama and McCain have echoed this call for a nuclear weapons-free world. In the first two years of the next administration, the following initial steps should be taken:
•   Renounce the first use of nuclear weapons and take weapons off hair-trigger alert.
•   Halt all new nuclear weapons programs. This week, Capitol Hill eliminated funding – yet again – for the Bush Administration’s so-called “Reliable Replacement Warhead”    (a new nuclear weapon).
•   Work with the international community to curb efforts to produce material for nuclear weapons (e.g., working on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT)); recommit to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) – pledging to work with other nuclear weapons states towards meeting the NPT goal of disarmament; and help nations secure their nuclear weapons stockpiles (through the Nunn-Lugar program and other available options).
•   Engage and encourage the Senate to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
•   The U.S. should work with Russia to accelerate the dismantling of existing nuclear stockpiles.

Merely possessing nuclear weapons is a dangerous proposition, even if they are never launched. For example, on August 29, 2007, six U.S. cruise missiles armed with nuclear warheads went missing for 36 hours. No one knew where they were or, even, that they were missing. Luckily, they were recovered and the U.S. Air Force personnel involved in the mishap reprimanded. Next time, we may not be so lucky.

Alexandra Toma is a Next America Fellow and currently the Director of the Peace and Security Initiative (PSI) for the Ploughshares Fund. She graduated summa cum laude with a Master's in Foreign Policy and Security Studies at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service and studied conflict resolution for her undergraduate work at the University of Virginia.

The content is exclusively the personal opinion of the author. Under no circumstances should the content be attributed to CSIS, Next America, or the author's employer, unless explicitly stated.

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Submitted by applecar on Fri, 11/06/2009 - 11:57.

In reference to a more imposing threat, non nation states, nuclear weapons are an ineffective deterrent. Tiffany Jewelry Even tactical nuclear weapons are of little utility considering their enormous international political costs associated with their use. Therefore since nuclear weapons offer little use against non-nation states, Tiffany Jewellery reducing our stockpiles and the hope of Russian reduction would increase US security by decreasing the amount of weapons obtainable in the world.

I think U.S. conventional

Submitted by avamcloughlin on Mon, 09/28/2009 - 01:04.

I think U.S. conventional superiority last forever? Hard to say. But the nuclear arms control regime is collapsing around us now. Taking credible steps towards dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation should be a top priority now and for the foreseeble future.

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I think U.S. conventional

Submitted by avamcloughlin on Mon, 09/28/2009 - 01:00.

Limited Nuclear Disarmament, A Viable Option

Submitted by Next America at UCLA on Tue, 02/24/2009 - 16:56.

We begin by stating that it is not realistic to consider the feasibility of total nuclear disarmament. However, there are some serious advantages of a limited nuclear disarmament. We agree with Toma that non- nations states pose the greatest security risk to the US and therefore the elimination of stockpiles reduces the risk of non- nation actors obtaining nuclear weapons. Second, considering the vast amount of nuclear weapons the US holds, a limited disarmament would not reduce the US’s influence at the negotiating table.
Nuclear weapons security is the primary concern and reason for disarming. Considering that even the US with its own robust defenses has had security lapses, the security of Russian and Pakistani nuclear weapons is much less comprehensive and significantly more vulnerable. It is our group’s sentiment that a reduction in US military stockpiles would in essence reduce the amount we have to secure and therefore reduce the risk of non- nation actors obtaining nuclear weapons. In addition, if the US sincerely reduces their nuclear stockpiles, the chance of serious reciprocation from Russia is encouraged and possible. Furthermore, American disarmament would enhance the moral position of the US at the negotiating table.
Others argued that a reduction in US stockpiles would be detrimental to US security however, considering the enormity of US stockpiles it is our sincere belief that the US’s position militarily in the world would not be gravely reduced. The US currently has about 5100 active nuclear warheads. Although Russia currently has approximately 6800, it should be noted that our negotiating position is not likely to be weakened even after reduction. In addition, the hope is that Russia and other nations would respond to mounting international pressure to disarm.
In reference to a more imposing threat, non nation states, nuclear weapons are an ineffective deterrent. Even tactical nuclear weapons are of little utility considering their enormous international political costs associated with their use. Therefore since nuclear weapons offer little use against non-nation states, reducing our stockpiles and the hope of Russian reduction would increase US security by decreasing the amount of weapons obtainable in the world.
Limited disarmament provides real advantages and although the US will have to act unilaterally, it will bring about political goodwill without truly jeopardizing the current American position. As long as the US doesn’t remove its nuclear weapons from strategic allies who rest their security on US nuclear weapons, the US can continue to labor under the belief that its allies will not pursue nuclear weapons in their own self-defense. Therefore, maintaining the current number of nuclear nations.

We Should Focus On Spending, Not Weapons

Submitted by david lettis on Mon, 01/26/2009 - 12:33.

The problem with nuclear weapons is that they are an unrealistic use of force, feasible only to prevent or retaliate against the use of other WMD arsenals. America should focus on stronger conventions with other nuclear powers that would both guarantee equal reductions as well as ensure that harsh punishments would be incurred on any nation developing nuclear weapons regardless of economic ties. More importantly, we can’t discuss nuclear weapons without discussing the military and military spending. Nuclear weapons are in question because of their devastating effects and their symbolism of an international power. The American military is always under scrutiny because of its devastating effects and symbolism of international power. They go hand in hand. Regardless of stockpile reductions, the United States must reduce military spending. If America reduces its stockpiles but increases or maintains its current military spending, it is actually more threatening to the world as it is capable of carrying out more operations on a smaller scale. With a smaller army but a maintained nuclear stockpile, America is showing it does not want to exert military influence across the globe, but will keep the means to drastically counterstrike – thus, preemptively stave off any attack against the U.S.

U.S. Should Not Eliminate Its Nuclear Stockpile

Submitted by Joshua Akery on Fri, 11/14/2008 - 19:33.

The severity of nuclear destruction is unrivaled by any other weapon. Because nuclear weapons are so terrible, it is easy to advocate eliminating them wherever they exist. The inherent value of ridding the world of these weapons seems obvious to most observers. The virtues of abolition appear even more self-evident in the post-Cold War environment.

Some argue that our nuclear posture directly influences how others perceive the value of nuclear weapons and that eliminating our stockpiles would slow proliferation. Nuclear aspirations are driven by a number of factors: national prestige, domestic politics, regional security concerns, etc. Assuming that other states are more concerned with imitating American positions than protecting their own security or national interests is inaccurate and dangerously self-centered. This lead-by-example approach to disarmament could inadvertently encourage proliferation among our non-nuclear allies without reducing the stockpiles of our nuclear allies or adversaries. U.S. nuclear guarantees allow some of our allies to forgo independent nuclear programs. Their continued abstinence depends on the credibility of our security arrangements. Eliminating U.S. stockpiles could undermine allied confidence in our nuclear umbrella and create greater nuclear incentives for our allies and our enemies.

American conventional primacy has reduced our dependence on nuclear capabilities. U.S. conventional power may also be the reason some states pursue nuclear weapons. The conventional superiority that allows us to publicly deemphasize the role of our nuclear force concurrently reinforces the importance of nuclear capabilities among our adversaries, which increasingly view these weapons as the only viable means of deterring the United States. In the absence of an American nuclear force, a single nuclear weapon would allow an adversary to threaten our allies, challenge our interests, and evade our conventional superiority without fear of escalation or retaliation. Nuclear weapons could strengthen conventional U.S. capabilities by raising the consequences facing weaker opponents that might consider nuclear, chemical or biological options to offset our conventional power. Although it is impossible to predict the behavior of a state facing certain defeat, the credible threat of nuclear devastation might prevent an enemy from expanding/escalating the level of conflict, allowing the U.S. to maximize its conventional advantage.

Deterrence is never certain, but in many cases nuclear deterrence is more reliable than conventional deterrence. Nuclear weapons derive their deterrent value from the immediate, unacceptable consequences that make them so repulsive. Conventional conflicts pose lower initial costs, which mount over time. Ridding the world of nuclear weapons would lower the potential costs of conventional war. Great powers might be more inclined to initiate conflicts if there were no possibility of nuclear escalation. The death and destruction caused by conventional attrition can surpass that of a nuclear attack. But because these costs are not immediate, decision makers have more time to compare fluctuating cost projections and expected political gains—and more opportunities for miscalculation. The initial cost of nuclear destruction far outweighs almost any expected benefit, exposing poor decisions before the fighting starts.

Policy decisions are susceptible to normative/emotional factors, which can obscure the range of possibilities and lead us to advocate preferred positions, even when less-noble policies offer better end results. The case for maintaining stockpiles of universally-abhorred weapons is unpopular, particularly when these weapons provide little deterrent protection against terrorists and other salient threats. Non-state enemies may be our most urgent challenge, but other threats will arise. Great-power conflict has not disappeared forever. The consequences of discounting this contingency would be unbearable. Threats will change, but the cost of maintaining our nuclear force will always be less than the cost of rebuilding during a crisis or being caught off guard by an existential threat. The uncertainty of future challenges—and international politics in general—justifies maintaining a dependable nuclear stockpile.

Truth Be Told

Submitted by curt1094 on Mon, 11/03/2008 - 20:46.

I doubt there is a human in the world that would say that we should not get rid of all the nuclear weapons on this Earth. Even with that being said there is no way that we can eliminate our nuclear stock pile just for defensive measures.

If we were to rid the world of nuclear weapons it would take a multilateral agreement from all the countries in the world. Just the fear of having the capablility to produce nuclear weapons will be enough to keep our nuclear stock pile right around there current levels for many years to come. Look at North Korea for an example, they easily breached the NPT agreement they had and began to pursue their own nuclear ambitions.

I will say that I strongly believe that as human beings we have to strategically begin to reduce the amount of nuclear weapons on Earth. Will we ever rid this Earth of nuclear weapons? Highly doubt it because we have the knowledge and equipment to develop nuclear weapons. Even if the world began talks to eliminate nuclear weapons we would never come to a agreement because there is to much fear of an entity developing these weapons and holding the world ransom

Nuclear Disarmament

Submitted by hawkerhurricane on Mon, 11/03/2008 - 19:39.

I’ve always found it hilarious that the US has enough nuclear warheads to destroy the world more than once. Really, this was so there would be enough locations from which to launch the second wave counterattack during world war three after the initial attack neutralized most of the stockpile, or at least that makes sense. Most of the countries we fight with nowadays are just as scared by a tank as an ICBM anyway, and this amount of destruction could only be useful for destroying a rogue asteroid hurtling toward Earth.

Basically, this yields the result that the stockpile isn’t useful. However, it is secure. If it were dismantled, where would all the parts and fissile materials go? It may be useful to decommission and yet keep in tack and secure all working nukes instead of spreading all these parts out and around, especially without a current high demand for civilian nuclear fuel.

Offense --> Defense?

Submitted by JHaefner on Mon, 11/03/2008 - 08:47.

I would agree with the above posters that the outright and immediate elimination of the United States' Nuclear Arms Program would have some very negative consequences. The primary reason we maintain these stockpiles, however, is a measure of protection (or at least retaliation) against attack from other nations armed with nuclear weapons. Rather than completely eliminating our stockpile, we could instead slowly and systematically dismantle it WHILE diverting a portion of the funding for its maintenance to the development of anti-missile defense systems.

If the technology of warfare has taught us anything, it is that 'to beat a rock, you don't always need a bigger rock'. An intelligently-designed Anti-missile Defense System:

A. Does not need to contain any kind of nuclear weaponry.

B. Would most likely cost a great deal less to maintain than our current nuclear stockpile.

C. Would provide much MORE protection against nuclear holocaust. Let's face it: our current nuclear stockpile isn't going to do anything to prevent a nuclear attack on our soil.

I think we as the United States should lead the world into a new era - moving from "well if I'm going to die, so are you!" to, "how about nobody dies."

Continued Disarment

Submitted by B3rooks on Sun, 10/19/2008 - 14:43.

An elimination of nuclear weapons programs and the arsenal associated with these programs would be disastrous and risky. Aside from the obvious point that nukes are dangerous, the persons involved with enrichment, maintenance, and planning of nuclear arms are themselves a nation security issue. The loss of these individuals due to nuclear arms elimination would give rogue states and terrorists an opportunity to either capture or recruit these persons.

As a nation we should do all that we can do to curb nuclear, bio and traditional arms from spreading throughout our planet.

Nuclear Weapons "Insurance Policy"

Submitted by darcibloyer on Mon, 10/06/2008 - 15:50.

In the current international security environment, the prospect that the United States will be engaged in a large-scale nuclear war is unlikely and the role of nuclear weapons in the 21st century is unclear. Despite this uncertainty, the United States should not eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile. Nuclear weapons are an “insurance policy” for the U.S. and its allies against potential coercion and aggression, especially a recidivist Russia. Decision-makers should take the following actions with respect to U.S. nuclear posture:

• Maintain U.S. nuclear weapons but adjust U.S. nuclear posture to appropriately reflect the 21st century environment; and
• Focus its efforts and investments on improving the safety and security of a smaller stockpile of U.S. nuclear weapons.

The Cold War theory that mutual assured destruction deterred U.S.-Soviet aggression is not necessarily applicable to 21st century security challenges. Our current adversaries include both state and non-state actors, some of which may not be deterred by the threat of large-scale nuclear retaliation. In today’s world, the U.S. can reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence—while still assuring its allies—without assuming too much risk of going to nuclear war. This is especially true if it enhances other means of deterrence, such as active and passive defenses and enhanced conventional capabilities. Other tools of national power (e.g. political, economic, and informational) are also employed to reduce the likelihood that the U.S. will need to use its nuclear weapons.

Decision-makers should also focus on improving the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons, which are maturing well-beyond their intended design life. The United States is currently the only nuclear weapon state without the capability to develop and produce nuclear weapons. Our existing stockpile is composed of warheads built using 1970s and 1980s technology. The size of the stockpile remains artificially high to account for potential technical failure of these aging warheads and our inability to develop new ones. Modern, safe, secure and reliable nuclear weapons could enable stockpile reductions through increased confidence in fewer weapons. An infrastructure capable of supporting the design and development of new weapons could also facilitate greater stockpile reductions. The cost of investing in these programs is relatively small compared to the overall defense budget. In Fiscal Year 2008, the National Nuclear Security Administration's direct costs for the nuclear weapons program totaled roughly $5 billion vice a $500+ billion overall defense budget; arguably a small price to pay for security in world where nuclear weapons are not only prevalent, but proliferating.

The increasing threat of nuclear proliferation in the 21st century (to non-nuclear weapons states or non-state organizations) leaves little chance that worldwide disarmament can be realized in our lifetime. The United States cannot make itself vulnerable to coercion and aggression by eliminating its nuclear weapons stockpile for the foreseeable future. But it should reposture its forces and reduce the size of its stockpile through a progressive nuclear weapons program. Nuclear weapons remain the foundation of our national security “insurance policy” in an uncertain threat environment.

Russia and Iran aren't credible threats to Turkey or Germany

Submitted by GregSanders on Mon, 10/06/2008 - 15:26.

I quite agree with Todd Fine, Brian Harding, and Alexandra Toma, so to keep this short I'll avoid reiterating their arguments.

Instead, I'll go a step further and one suggestion Scott Duncan made regarding the risk that disarmament would cause Germany and Turkey to go nuclear. That idea would perhaps have held in the Cold War when the USSR was often thought to have superior conventional capabilities to NATO. That was why the U.S. was unwilling to renounce launching a nuclear first strike, we were afraid that on a pure military to military level, the USSR would win.

That just won't happen with Russia, let alone Iran. Yes the country has burgeoning oil revenues, but its demographics are not so hardy. Moreover, Germany's GDP is 3.3 trillion dollars versus Russia's 1.3 trillion. Russia does have a bigger economy than Turkey's 0.6 $T, but Turkey is still much bigger than Iran's 0.3 $T. Again, as all the other commenters mentioned, no one is proposing unilateral disarmament. The key thing is that we now live in a world where multilateral disarmament will not leave U.S. allies in Europe at risk.

The situation in Asia is a bit different, but so long as we make all moves in consultation with the Japanese government we should be able to avoid leaving them feeling exposed. Particularly since China is looking to modernize but their capabilities are really aimed at Taiwan, not their other neighbors. (I don't really want to get into Taiwan here, but I think keeping any potential confrontations nonnuclear is in the best interest of everyone involved).

Will U.S. conventional superiority last forever? Hard to say. But the nuclear arms control regime is collapsing around us now. Taking credible steps towards dealing with the problem of nuclear proliferation should be a top priority now and for the foreseeble future.

Unilateral disarmament is not the question

Submitted by toddfine on Wed, 10/01/2008 - 21:38.

The question suggests that the United States must decide now whether it intends to eliminate its nuclear weapons stockpile in the future.

However, this question does not animate the topical return of the aspiration of "a world without nuclear weapons." Unilateral disarmament is not on the table. Yet the degree to which we embrace this goal rhetorically sends a message itself.

Past Presidents like Ronald Reagan, John F. Kennedy, and Dwight Eisenhower explicitly presented a fundamentally moral case for eventual elimination. Yet today, while leaders of other nuclear powers like the United Kingdom, China, India, and Pakistan have embedded this desire in their rhetoric on nuclear weapons, top United States officials have, for the most part, been reluctant to follow suit.

Fortunately, as Alexandra Toma mentioned, both major U.S. presidential candidates have neutralized the debate about the desirability of the "end-state" by mutually forwarding that this goal will form the core basis of their policies on nuclear weapons. If this election-year rhetoric materializes into presidential policy, it could have a dramatic effect on international opinion about the feasibility of elimination. Former chief U.S. nuclear negotiator Max Kampelman has argued that a U.S. President's embrace of this goal at a major forum like the UN General Assembly could dramatically transform conventions about what is possible.

As Scott Duncan's well-reasoned arguments attest, it would be quite a struggle -- both politically and operationally -- for an actual treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons to move forward. Yet at the same time, the Reykjavik example gives us hope that an inspired set of international leaders might just be able to accomplish the task.

Too Stark a Choice

Submitted by Brian Harding on Wed, 10/01/2008 - 18:21.

If required to give a yes or no answer, I would have to support maintaining a nuclear stockpile as long as any other nuclear-armed country (i.e. Russia) poses an existential threat to the United States. However, forgoing the "zero option" does not mean that U.S. nuclear policy ought not change.

The United States ought to cite the ASPIRATION to eliminate its nuclear stockpile and take meaningful steps to reduce it. With concerns over the enduring strength of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is important to remember that the treaty runs two ways. While non-nuclear weapons state signatories are prohibited from acquiring nuclear weapons, the treaty also contains language that many understand to mean that nuclear weapons states should seek to someday eliminate their own stockpiles.

The global non-proliferation regime is on shaky ground and could become a crisis if Iran develops nuclear weapons and its neighbors follow suit. Clearly, the United States won't go to zero (or even close) in the near-term, but it should take this symbolic step and begin to decrease its (bloated) stockpile immediately.